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Abstract
We analyse preferences for public, private or mixed provision of childcare theoreti-
cally and empirically. We model childcare as a publicly provided private good. Richer
households should prefer private provision to either pure public or mixed provision.
If public provision redistributes from rich to poor, they should favour mixed over
pure public provision, but if public provision redistributes from poor to rich, the rich
and poor might favour mixed provision while the middle class favour public provision
(‘ends against the middle’). Using estimates for household preferences from survey
data, we ￿nd no support for the ends-against-the-middle result.
JEL classi￿cation: J13, D72, H42, D19
Keywords: childcare, redistribution, political preferences, public provision of private
goods.
¤We would like to thank Peter Haan, Thomas Siedler and Viktor Steiner for helpful comments. 1 Introduction
In many countries, the provision of childcare has received increased attention in recent
years. There seem to be several reasons for this. In the US, interest has focused on
the e￿ect of educating disadvantaged children, whose opportunities may be enhanced by
early childhood education programmes. In many European countries, an important issue
is female labour force participation, which is often hampered by limited availability of
childcare. Hence, in di￿erent places worldwide, there seems to be increased demand for
childcare provision. An important question is whether provision should be organised by the
public or left to private forces. Apart from issues of market failure in childcare provision
(see Blau and Currie, 2006), the choice of regime has clear redistributive consequences,
since public provision is usually ￿nanced to a large extent by redistributive taxes.
In this paper, we analyse household preferences over public, private or mixed provi-
sion of childcare both theoretically and empirically. The theoretical model builds on the
redistributive aspect of public provision of private goods (see Besley and Coate, 1991; Ep-
ple and Romano, 1996a). We consider households who di￿er in income and analyse their
preferences over three di￿erent regimes: purely private provision, purely public provision,
and mixed provision where households can opt out of the public sector and use private
childcare instead. We ￿nd that richer households should prefer market provision to purely
public or mixed provision. Preferences for public versus mixed provision depend on the
redistributive e￿ect of public provision. If richer households want less public provision than
poorer ones, mixed provision results in a median voter equilibrium and richer households
generally prefer mixed to public provision. However, it may also be that richer households
prefer more public provision (because demand increases faster with income than it falls
with households’ tax price). In this case, mixed provision leads to an ‘ends against the
middle’ equilibrium (Epple and Romano, 1996a,b): the poor and rich want low spending
(the rich use private childcare while the poor prefer less childcare than the middle class or
rich) while the middle class want high public spending. In this case, the same argument
implies that we may ￿nd that the rich and poor favour mixed provision while the middle
class favour public provision.
We also estimate the relationship between income and people’s preferences for childcare
regimes empirically, using survey data from Germany. Since Germany has a large public
childcare sector but also some private providers, we argue that its childcare system corre-
1sponds to the mixed system in our model. We ￿nd that as predicted, richer individuals
prefer private provision to public or mixed provision. We also ￿nd that richer households
favour mixed over purely public provision. Thus, our evidence does not seem to support
the ends against the middle hypothesis. The main contribution of the paper is to clearly
link a theoretical model of preferences over policies to micro-evidence on individual pref-
erences. As far as we know, this is also the ￿rst paper to directly test whether an ‘ends
against the middle’ type equilibrium can emerge in a speci￿c policy area.
Our paper is related to several lines of research. First, many researchers have addressed
the reasons for public provision of childcare. If there are market failures in the provision
of childcare, then public provision may be warranted.1 There are several lines of argument
(Blau, 2001; Blau and Currie, 2006): (1) Private markets may fail because some parents
are liquidity constrained and may not be able to a￿ord the amount of childcare they would
like, (2) parents may be poorly informed about the quality of childcare providers, which
can lead to well known problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, and (3) there
are thought to be externalities from childcare in the form of better social outcomes, such
as higher education achievements, lower crime rates, drug use, teenage pregnancies, and
so on (see e.g. Heckman and Masterov, 2007). Although we are mainly interested in the
redistributive e￿ects of childcare provision, we will return to the issue of market failure
below. The reason is that our empirical analysis shows that individuals have a relatively
low preference for private provision, which may be due to real or perceived market failure.
Second, our model is related to the literature on the political determination of public
provision of private goods. Besley and Coate (1991) showed that public provision of private
goods can be used to redistribute income. We use the model of Epple and Romano (1996a)
￿ adapted to the case of childcare ￿ who analyse public provision with private alternatives.
Epple and Romano (1996b) study provision of goods such as health care, where public
provision can be topped up by private provision. They also study the equilibrium choice
of regime and show that ￿ under some assumptions ￿ mixed provision beats either pure
public or pure private provision. We follow the same approach but explicitly analyse
the preferences of di￿erent households over the regimes, in order to lay the foundation
for our empirical analysis. There are some papers with empirical evidence about the
public provision of private goods, but this evidence is mostly indirect. Cohen-Zada and
Justman (2003) analyse provision of local public schooling with private alternatives. Using
1Although in many cases, subsidising private provision may be more e￿cient than public provision.
2a mixture of simulation and regression analysis with aggregate spending data from US cities
and school districts, they ￿nd no support for the ends-against-the-middle hypothesis.2 In
particular, their result is based on estimated price and income elasticities from aggregate
data. By contrast, we directly estimate individual preferences over regimes and do not rely
on aggregate variables. Merzyn and Ursprung (2005) analyse voter support for privatisation
using data from Swiss referenda. They also ￿nd no support for the ends-against-the-middle
hypothesis. Our approach is di￿erent, again, in that we use individual micro-data instead
of approval rates aggregated at the district level as Merzyn and Ursprung (2005).
There are also a couple of other papers on the political determinants of family policies.
Bergstrom and Blomquist (1995) study the political economy of childcare. They argue
that taxpayers may support childcare subsidies in order to induce women to enter the
labour force, which increases taxable income. Booth and Sepulveda (2007) analyse a model
with voting on social security and fertility subsidies. They ￿nd that individuals vote
strategically, since fertility incentives change the future support for social security. Both
papers are related to ours but have a di￿erent focus; in addition, they are purely theoretical,
while we combine theory and evidence.
Third, there is a growing empirical literature on preferences for redistribution. Our
paper follows a similar approach, but we focus on childcare provision instead of broad
redistribution. To cite just a few examples of this literature, Corneo and Gr￿ner (2002)
look at individual preferences for redistribution and ￿nd that, consistent with the idea
of self-interested individuals, richer individuals prefer less redistribution, although other
motives (which they call public values and social rivalry) also play a role. Alesina and La
Ferrara (2005) focus on the US and ￿nd that social mobility plays a key role in determining
preferences for redistribution. Using the same data as we do, Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln
(2007) analyse preferences for redistribution by East and West Germans. They ￿nd that
East Germans are much more in favour of government redistribution than West Germans.
They interpret this as evidence that communism shapes people’s preferences. We ￿nd a
similar e￿ect of East versus West in the determination of preferences for public childcare
provision.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the theoretical model
used to derive testable hypotheses about preferences for childcare regimes. In Section 3, we
2Fernandez and Rogerson (2003) also calibrate an education ￿nance system to US data, and ￿nd an
elasticity of substitution of 0.5 ￿ts the data best. Again, this is not consistent with the EATM hypothesis.
3simulate the model numerically, with functional forms and parameters roughly calibrated
to match German data on income distribution, public childcare spending and participation
in private childcare. In Section 4, we discuss in how far the theoretical model provides a
good description of the German childcare system. Section 5 presents our empirical analysis
and the last section concludes.
2 The model
We consider a simple model where households, consisting of husband and wife, make choices
over childcare. Households have identical quasiconcave utility functions de￿ned over con-
sumption c and children, n:3
U = u(c;n);
with uc;un > 0 > ucc;unn (subscripts denote partial derivatives). We consider two possible
interpretations with respect to the nature of n in the utility function: one is a long-run
perspective, where households, at the point in time we observe, compute their current and
future desired fertility levels. This would be sensible if we think of rational forward looking
households, who, even if they do not now have children, consider that they may want to
have children in the future. In the other interpretation, we take the number of children to
be ￿xed in the short run, and suppose that households make decisions on childcare, which
in￿uences the ‘quality’ of any given number of children.4
Households allocate their income between consumption and bought-in childcare (if any).
In the following, by private childcare we mean childcare purchased in the market, not
childcare in the home. The household budget constraint is:
c + g = (1 ¡ t)(wm + wf(1 ¡ Á)); (1)
where wm and wf are the husband’s and wife’s wage, t the income tax rate, Á is the wife’s
time devoted to childcare, and g is bought in childcare ￿ if any ￿ at price of 1. We assume
3The theory part looks at households’ preferences, that is, we do not consider bargaining or con￿ict
within households. In the empirical part, our unit of analysis is the individual. We simply posit that an
individual within a couple has preferences which are linked to the household’s budget, so we will control
for own income and the partner’s income for individuals who live with a partner.
4By quality here we mean how households perceive childcare to a￿ect the outcomes ￿ educational or
social ￿ of their children.
4the husband works full time for one unit of time, while the wife works when not rearing
children at home. For simplicity, we treat Á as ￿xed. We do not here explicitly model
the household’s choice of home care versus institutional care. In an extended framework,
we could treat Á as endogenous as in Apps and Rees (2004), but this would complicate
the analysis without substantially changing our results. However, it is useful to keep in
mind that household preferences for public childcare also depend on the household’s costs
of raising children at home, which depends on (mainly women’s) wages.
We can then write the household wage income as w ´ wm + wf(1 ¡ Á).5 Income
is distributed according to the distribution function H(w) with continuous density h(w).
Median income is denoted by wm and mean income by ¹ w.
Following Apps and Rees (2004), production of childcare is given by
n = f(x;Á);
where x 2 fG;gg is childcare outside the home which consists of privately (g) or publicly
supplied childcare (G). For simplicity, in what follows we suppress Á in the production
function and assume a linear relationship n = x.
2.1 Chidcare regimes
2.1.1 Private childcare
Let us ￿rst look at a purely private childcare regime. For simplicity, we will treat the
number of children as ￿xed. However, treating fertility as endogenous would produce
similar results, with the utilities below having to be interpreted as indirect utilities where
households have optimised over n.
With private childcare and ￿xed n, households maximise U by choice of g subject to
the budget constraint (1) and n = g. The resulting utility level is denoted by
V
MO(w) = v(w) ´ max
g¸0
u(w ¡ g;g); (2)
where the superscript MO refers to ‘market only’ and v(w) is the indirect utility function,
which is increasing in w.
5For now, we don’t distinguish between households with rich husband and poor wife on the one hand
and poor husband and rich wife on the other. In the empirical section, however, we will test for the e￿ects
of individuals’ own income and that of their partners separately.
5The ￿rst order condition for g, assuming an interior solution is:
¡uc + un = 0: (3)
The optimal choice is denoted as gMO(w) and is increasing in w.
2.1.2 Purely public childcare
Suppose now that provision is purely public. Household utility is given by
V = u((1 ¡ t)w;G): (4)
The government budget constraint is
¹ nG = t ¹ w; (5)
where ¹ n is the average number of children per household.
The decision on the provision level is taken by simple majority vote. Each household
then votes for the level of public childcare and tax rate to maximise u((1¡t)w;G) subject
to the budget constraint (5).
Due to our assumption of ￿xed wages, the government budget constraint is linear.
Together with our assumptions on the utility function, this implies that utility is single
peaked in the level of provision G and a voting equilibrium exists, namely the median of
the optimal provision levels of all voters. In order to study how the optimal provision level
changes with income, we look at households’ indi￿erence curves in (t;g) space. From (4),
















Following Epple and Romano (1996a), we will consider two cases.
Case 1 (SRI) Slope rising with income: dM=dw > 0.
Case 2 (SDI) Slope decreasing with income: dM=dw < 0.
When household income increases, there are two opposing e￿ects on its willingness to
pay for public childcare: ￿rst, the demand for childcare increases since childcare is a normal
good. Second, the price of childcare increases because of the linear income tax. If the price
6elasticity of demand is larger than the income elasticity, the second e￿ect dominates which
implies SDI, i.e. that richer households want marginally lower taxes than poorer ones.
Conversely, when the income elasticity is larger, we have SRI and richer households prefer
marginally higher taxes.
Under either assumption, household preferences in the purely public provision regime
can be ordered independently of the policy. This implies that the household with median
income is decisive over the policy choice. We can then write household utility in the public
regime (superscript GO for ‘government only’) as
V






2.1.3 Mixed public/private regime
Let us now consider the mixed public/private regime, where households may opt out of
public childcare and choose privately supplied childcare instead (Epple and Romano 1996a).
Public childcare is still ￿nanced by general income taxes, so households who choose private
childcare still have to pay for public provision through taxes, but they can also vote on the
provision level.
We assume the following sequence of events: ￿rst, households vote on the tax rate and
level of publicly provided childcare and then, each household chooses whether to use public
or private childcare. We solve the game backwards.
For a given level of taxes and childcare spending, households choose public childcare if
u((1 ¡ t)w;G) > v((1 ¡ t)w) ´ max
g
u((1 ¡ t)w ¡ g;g): (8)
It is easy to show that if there is a wage income ~ w(t;G) such that u((1¡t)~ w(t;G);G) =
v((1¡t) ~ w(t;G)), all households with w > ~ w(¢) will choose private childcare and all others
public childcare. This is intuitive, since households who choose private childcare have to
pay fees in addition to the income tax. Hence, only rich households ￿nd this pro￿table.
The fraction of children in public childcare is then ¯(t;G) ´ H(~ w(t;G)), and the public
budget constraint is
¯(¢)¹ nG = t ¹ w: (9)














where ²¯;t and ²¯;G are the elasticities of public childcare attendance with respect to the
tax rate and public spending level. Both elasticities are positive: increasing G obviously
makes the public alternative more attractive, while increasing t reduces utility in both
public and private childcare, but due to diminishing marginal utility, the utility in the
private alternative decreases by more.
Consider household preferences over public spending and taxes in the mixed regime. For
each household, there is a function ^ G(t), which makes the household indi￿erent between
public and private childcare. This function satis￿es d ^ G=dt < 0 and d ^ G=dw > 0 (Epple and
Romano, 1996a). Typical indi￿erence curves thus have the shape shown in Figure 1: the
horizontal part is relevant when G < ^ G(t) where the household chooses private childcare;
here, utility depends only on the tax rate and an increase in public childcare has no e￿ect
on utility. For G > ^ G(t), the indi￿erence curves are upward sloping with slope given by
(6).
The outcome of the voting game depends on how the slope of these indi￿erence curves
varies with income: When SDI holds, the indi￿erence curves of any two households cross
at most once. Richer households have a marginally lower preference for public spending
than poorer ones, and the richest households who opt out of public childcare prefer zero
public spending. This implies that an equilibrium exists and is given by the optimum
allocation of the household with the median income (see Epple and Romano, 1996a, for




On the other hand, when SRI holds, di￿erent households’ indi￿erence curves can cross
twice, and an equilibrium may not exist. If it does exist, it can be shown that the decisive
voter has income wd, which satis￿es
F(wd) + 1 ¡ F(~ w(td;G(td))); (11)
where td is the optimal tax rate of household wd (Epple and Romano, 1996a). The intuition




Figure 1: Households indi￿erence curves in the GM regime
rich households prefer zero public spending since they opt for private childcare. There
are thus 50% of households (those with wage income in the interval [wd; ~ w(¢)]) who favour
marginally higher taxes than td. On the other hand, there are also 50% (those with income
below wd or above ~ w(¢)) who prefer marginally lower taxes. This is the ‘ends against the
middle’ result of Epple and Romano (1996a): The middle class who want high spending
levels are opposed by the rich and poor who want low spending levels. Epple and Romano
(1996a) argue that this may be the relevant assumption for education, and childcare (or pre-
school education) may have similar attributes. Note that it must be true that wd < wm,
since at the median income household’s preferred tax rate, more than 50% prefer lower
taxes (all w < wm and all w > ~ w(tm)).
Note that condition (11) only ensures that locally, there is no majority in favour of a
tax rate smaller or larger than td, but due to the failure of single crossing, this does not
imply that td is a global equilibrium. This has to be checked, i.e. we have to make sure
that there is no other tax rate which commands a majority against td. In the numerical
simulations, this is done ‘by hand’ by checking over a dense grid of alternative tax rates
that none of them wins against td in a pairwise vote.
92.2 Preferences over childcare regimes
Our aim is to study household preferences over public versus private childcare. Therefore,
we study how household preferences over the three regimes, MO;GO and GM, are de-
termined by income. We can trace out some general propositions, although some of the
results will depend on the speci￿c relationship between spending levels and tax rates under
the GM and GO regimes. Here, we will present some results under speci￿c assumptions
on tax rates and spending levels, but in the next section, we use numerical simulations to
show that these relationships are plausible under the speci￿c functional forms used.
MO vs GO. We ￿rst study preferences over purely private versus public childcare. It is
rather intuitive that richer households should prefer private childcare, and indeed, this is
our ￿rst result. We make the realistic assumption that the income distribution is skewed
to the right so mean income exceeds median income.
Assumption 1 The median income is below the average income, wm < ¹ w.
This implies that the ‘tax price’ under public provision (i.e., the part of the total cost
to be ￿nanced) for the median income household is less than one, i.e. they are e￿ectively
subsidised by public provision. We can now prove our ￿rst result:
Proposition 1 There exists an income level ^ w such that V GO(^ w) = V MO( ^ w). All house-
holds with w > ^ w prefer MO and all others prefer GO.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¥
MO vs GM. Second, we study preferences over purely private versus mixed provision.
Our result here parallels that of the previous subsection:
Proposition 2 There exists an income level w such that all w < w prefer GM and all
others prefer MO.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¥
10GO vs GM. Third, let us look at preferences for pure public versus mixed provision. In
order to analyse the preferences over these two regimes, we need to consider the determi-
nation of the tax rate and spending level under the two regimes, since this obviously a￿ects
households’ preferences over one or the other regime. In comparing the voting outcomes,
we have to account for the fact that the incomes of the decisive voters as well as the gov-
ernment budget sets under the two regimes di￿er. For concreteness, we will suppose that
utility is of the CES type. In that case, the income elasticity is one and the price elasticity
exceeds the income elasticity if and only if the elasticity of substitution ¾ is larger than
one. Hence, ¾ < 1 implies SRI, and ¾ > 1 implies SDI. The following e￿ects can then be
discerned:
1. The decisive voter under GM has lower income than under GO : wd < wm. If ¾ < 1,
this will imply tGM < tGO;GGM < GGO, other things equal, while ¾ > 1 will imply
tGM > tGO;GGM > GGO.
2. Assuming ¯ < 1, the tax price of public childcare is lower under GM than under GO,
since tax revenue is spread over fewer children. This will imply GGM > GGO, other
things equal, while on the other hand it implies tGM < tGO if ¾ < 1 (if demand is
inelastic, expenditure falls if the price falls, so the tax rate must be lower with lower
price) and tGM > tGO if ¾ > 1.
3. Since ²n;t;²n;G > 0, the GBC under GM is steeper than that under GO (see (10)),
which implies tGM < tGO;GGM < GGO.
While in general it is not a priori clear which e￿ects prevail, we will assume that the
mixed regime yields lower tax rates and public spending. This seems reasonable, as it is
also the result of the simulations in the next section.
Proposition 3 Suppose that tGM < tGO and GGM < GGO. (i) Under SDI, if there is an
income level w0 such that V GO(w0) = V GM(w0), all w < w0 prefer GO and all others GM.
(ii) Under SRI, if there are two households with incomes w00 < w000 who are indi￿erent
between regime GM and regime GO, then all households with w 2 [w00;w000] prefer GO to
GM and all others prefer GM to GO.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¥
113 Numerical simulation
We now simulate the model numerically to illustrate the results from the previous section.
We choose parameters to approximate key variables empirically observed in Germany, in
particular the income distribution and public childcare spending. Except for childcare
spending, all data are computed from the 2002 wave of the SOEP.6







¾¡1; ° > 0: (12)
In view of the empirical analysis, we note that by assumption, households here di￿er
only with respect to income, whereas empirically of course, they di￿er in many other
respects. We thus interpret the results in this section as depicting the preferences of
households with average characteristics as a function of wage income only.
The income distribution is assumed to be lognormal: lny » N(¹;v). We set the
parameters of the distribution function such that we match the empirical distribution of
household pre-tax income in Germany in 2002. Mean income was 34,693 Euro and median
income 29,733 Euro. If we measure income in thousands, we can solve for ¹ = 3:34;v =
0:64.
We now calibrate the model as follows: ° and ¾ are chosen such that under the political
equilibrium in the GM regime we can replicate the values observed in Germany in 2002.
In particular, total public spending is approximately 4500 Euro per year (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2007). Since there are 0.28 children per household, spending per household
is 0:28 ¢ 4500 = 1260:4 Euro. The share of children in public childcare was approximately
96%.7 Under SRI, we can replicate these values by setting ° = 0:047 and ¾ = 0:95. Using
these parameters, under the GM regime, we ￿nd GGM = 1;261:62;tGM = 0:0348, and
¯ = 0:96. For the GO regime, we ￿nd GGO = 1;3841;tGO = 0:03989, so the tax rate and
public spending under purely public provision are higher than in the mixed regime.
We show results for case SRI ￿rst and for SDI second. Results for SRI are in Figures
2￿4. The results portray the following scenario. First, richer households clearly prefer
market provision over pure government provision (Figure 2). Second, richer households
likewise tend to prefer private over mixed provision (Figure 3), but the utility di￿erence
6We use data from 2002 since this wave is also used in the empirical estimation, see section 5.
7See Table 1 below.






Figure 2: Preferences for pure public vs market provision
V MO ¡ V GM is decreasing in income for those households who actually use the private
sector under the mixed system. Third, the utility di￿erence between purely public and
mixed provision, V GO ¡ V GM is increasing in w for households who use the public sector
under the mixed system and decreasing in income for those who use the private system.
However, as Figure 4 shows, under the parameters used, there are no households who prefer
purely public over mixed provision. We will see in Section 5 that this indeed holds when all
household characteristics other than income are held constant at the sample mean. There
are, however, other preference shifters which make some households prefer the GO system,
see below.
Figures 5￿7 show the results for the case of SDI. Calibrating ° and ¾ as before now yields
° = 0:38;¾ = 0:99 (i.e. very close to Cobb-Douglas). We now ￿nd GGM = 1;1292:8;tGM =
0:0313, and ¯ = 0:96.8 For the GO regime, we ￿nd GGO = 1;2328:8;tGO = 0:0355, so again
the tax rate and public spending under purely public provision are higher than in the mixed
regime.
The preferences for pure government versus market only (Figure 5) and purely private
versus mixed system (Figure 6) look relatively similar to the SRI case. Figure 7 shows,
however, that the preference for the purely public over the mixed system is now mono-
tonically decreasing in income, with a kink at the income level of the household who is
just indi￿erent between public and private childcare under the mixed system. Again, all
8With ¾ strictly less than one, we cannot exactly reproduce the spending level of 1260.





Figure 3: Preferences for market vs mixed provision








Figure 4: Preferences for pure public vs mixed provision









Figure 5: Preferences for pure public vs market provision (case SDI)
households prefer the mixed system, which would no longer necessarily be true if we let
preferences vary among households.
An important point for the empirical section is that the estimation of preferences over
the GO versus GM regime allows us to discriminate between the SDI and SRI case: if
we ￿nd that V GO ¡ V GM is decreasing in income, this would rule out SRI, since here the
utility di￿erence should be increasing over the middle range of the income distribution.
4 Institutional background
The ultimate goal of this paper is to estimate household preferences over childcare policies,
based on the predictions of the theoretical model. To do so, we argue that households
behave as if they compute the equilibria under the di￿erent regimes as shown in the previous
two sections. The present system in Germany, we argue, is a mixed regime, so households
know their utility level under the current (GM) regime, which they then compare to their
imputed utility level under the other two (hypothetical) regimes, namely GO and MO.
We now argue in some detail why the GM regime is a good approximation of the current
system of childcare provision in Germany.
At current, public and private childcare institutions co-exist in Germany. The majority
of the institutions that provide care for pre-school aged children are run by the communities
and another considerable share is run by private non-pro￿t organizations such as churches,








Figure 6: Preferences for market vs mixed provision (case SDI)





Figure 7: Preferences for pure public vs mixed provision (case SDI)
16who are also heavily subsidized by the public. Only a very small share of all childcare
institutions is run by private, for-pro￿t, non-subsidized enterprises, as can be seen from
Table 1. In addition, there is a growing market of non-institutionalized childcare in the
private sector in the form of nannies, private child minders or family day care. Some of these
forms are also subsidized by the communities, while others are purely privately organized.
Unfortunately, for this private market, empirical evidence on utilization is rather scarce.
Survey-based evidence from data-sets such as the SOEP only includes utilization of these
forms of childcare, without further information on hours of care or possible subsidies.
Table 1: Form of childcare used for children aged up to 6 years
year 2002 2005
Children attending childcare institutions 51% 56%
thereof:
public institutions 59% 58%
church-based institutions 33% 34%
private non-pro￿t institutions 5% 4%
employer-based institutions <1% <1%
private for-pro￿t institutions 2% 3%
Children cared for by paid nannies within their household: ￿ 2%
Children cared for by paid nannies ouside their household ("Family day care"): 3%1 3%
Total number of observations: 2,063 1,635
1 For the 2002 wave, there is only information on childcare by a paid nanny, without distinction
whether this takes place within or outside the household.
Source: SOEP, waves 2002 and 2005.
Financing scheme for public childcare. An important point to note ￿ and a di￿erence
to the stylized ￿mixed childcare regime￿ described in the theory section above ￿ is that
parents have to pay fees even for childcare institutions that are public or publicly subsidized.
The fees are set by the communities and generally depend on parents’ income and the age
of the child.9 Both, public institutions as well as privately run but subsidized institutions,
usually charge fees according to a similar scheme. As shown in Table 2, fees amounted to
roughly 100 Euro per month on average for a full-time slot for a child aged 3 to 6 years.
This covers only a small fraction of total costs, obviously. Public expenditures per childcare
slot amount to about 350 Euro per month for a child in the older age group and about 700
Euro per month for children under three years.
9Since fees are set at the community level, there is a relatively wide variety of fee schedules. In most
communities, however, fees increase in household income up to a cap.
17Table 2: Public expenditures and parents’ fees of center-based childcare
Children aged 0-3 Children aged 4-6
public expenditures parents’ fees public expenditures parents’ fees
year 2005 2002 2005 2005 2002 2005
part-time care not available 67 107 224 66 76
full-time care 717 122 124 358 94 104
Note: Childcare costs refer to Euro per month.
Source: Numbers on public expenditures are taken from Statistisches Bundesamt (2007),
parents’ fees from SOEP, waves 2002 and 2005.
Under stylised assumptions, the existence of parents’ fees does not change the predic-
tions of the theoretical model. Suppose for simplicity that parents have to pay fees which
are linear in income and subsidised at rate s: (1 ¡ s)kwG would be the fee to be paid
by parents with wage income w.10 Then taxes have to pay for aggregate subsidies, so the
government budget constraint is
¹ nsG = t ¹ w: (13)
Using (13) and setting k = ¹ n= ¹ w, the individual budget constraint can be be written
c = (1 ¡ t)w ¡ (1 ¡ s)kwG (14)




which is obviously the same as free provision and tax ￿nancing with the government budget
constraint given by (5). As long as the fee schedule has the same shape as the tax schedule,
it obviously does not matter whether households pay fees or whether provision is ￿nanced
through taxes. Thus, the theoretical model should be a good approximation of the real
system.
Rationing. As can be seen from Table 1, the large majority of children up to six years
who attend childcare facilities use either publicly provided or publicly subsidized forms
of childcare. Both forms can be interpreted as provided by the ￿state￿ since access to
these institutions is similarly managed and also the fee structure is the same in public
and publicly subsidized institutions. One problem with this form of childcare in Germany
10There are few communities that charge ￿at fees. If public provision is ￿nanced by subsidies, this
would not change our results. (It should be noted again that about 80% of costs are subsidised for children
under three.) However, to the extent that public provision is ￿nanced by fees, the redistributive element is
obviously eliminated. The same argument would, however, apply to purely public provision if the ￿nancing
scheme were the same as for mixed provision.
18is, however, that there is rationing, in particular for children under three years in West
Germany. Compared to other European countries, Germany has relatively low availability
rates of public or publicly subsidized childcare for children under three years. In the year
2002, for example, there were only 3 slots per 100 children in this age group in West
Germany. In East Germany, where full-time public childcare for children in all age groups
was provided as part of the explicit policy to foster mothers’ employment under the former
German Democratic Republic regime (see Rosenfeld et al., 2004), availability of childcare
is still much higher and amounted to almost 40% in 2002. In the past years, however, West
German communities have caught up and the latest numbers show an availability rate of
8% for children under three years in West Germany. The low availability of subsidized
childcare in West Germany that is ￿ if available ￿ relatively cheap for parents, leads to
excess demand for this type of childcare. Empirical studies have shown that in 2002, about
25% of all children whose parents desired a childcare slot did not have access to subsidized
childcare (Wrohlich, 2008).
How does this a￿ect the results of the theoretical model? Suppose that a household who
applies for a public childcare slot perceives a probability p to receive a place. We allow this
to be a function of income, p(w). For instance, it might be that richer (or better educated)
parents have better chances of receiving a slot, because they are better at dealing with
bureaucracies, or conversely, it might be that for political reasons, poorer families receive
a higher priority.
The important point is that with respect to the GM system, a household who chooses
to apply for public childcare now has an expected utility
EV
GM = p(w)u((1 ¡ t)w;G) + (1 ¡ p(w))v((1 ¡ t)w): (16)
The determination of equilibrium proceeds as before and depends on whether preferences
satisfy SDI or SRI. Which case applies now also depends on e.g., the degree of risk aversion
and how it varies with income, and on how the probability of obtaining a slot changes with
parents’ income.
How this a￿ects the utility of the mixed system is relatively complicated to determine,
since one would have to predict the tax rate and spending level in the voting equilibrium.
However, we can speculate on how preferences change for given tax and spending levels.
First, since rationing introduces uncertainty, risk aversion means that utility decreases
compared to a certain world. This is true for all income levels. Whether this e￿ect is
19more or less severe for richer parents depends on how risk aversion changes with income.
For instance, if absolute risk aversion decreases with income, this would be less severe for
richer households in the mixed system. Second, we have to consider how the probability
of obtaining a slot changes with income. Any household who applies for a public slot must
prefer public to private childcare, i.e. u((1 ¡ t)w;G) ¡ v((1 ¡ t)w) > 0. If p0(w) > 0,
the expected utility in (16) would increase in w, other things equal. Hence, it is possible
that rationing favours richer parents in the GM system. But this depends on a number of
assumptions, in particular how risk aversion and the probability of obtaining a rationed
slot depends on income. In fact, Wrohlich (2008) ￿nds no evidence that the probability of
obtaining a rationed slot increases with household income. Moreover, the same argument
could be made for a purely public system if households assume that there would be rationing
in such a system, too.
Tax progression. Finally, the assumption of proportional income taxes is not literally
true for Germany, because income taxes are directly progressive with increasing average
and marginal tax rates. Thus, it could be that our empirical results are biased against SRI
because in reality households’ taxes rise more than proportionately with income. However,
assuming that the tax schedule is of the form ta(w) with a0;a00 > 0 (i.e.directly progressive
with increasing marginal tax rates), our results would generalise, but the condition for SRI
would obviously require a larger income elasticity than under a proportional tax system.
Moreover, childcare in Germany is ￿nanced by the communities. These levy their own
taxes, namely the business tax (Gewerbesteuer) and property tax (Grundsteuer), and in
addition they receive part of the large shared tax bases, in particular the income tax and
the VAT. Furthermore, there is a system of ￿scal equalization between the states and within
states. In summary, it is far from clear that the marginal ￿nancing source for community
spending on childcare is not proportional.
5 Data, empirical model and results
5.1 Data
In the following, we analyze empirically how income sa￿ect preferences over the three
childcare regimes. We draw on data from Germany, thus the spending levels and tax rates
are given by the current German system described above.
20What we need for our empirical analysis is a data-set that provides information on (i)
preferences over childcare regimes and (ii) wages or income. The German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP) contains information on both variables. The SOEP is a representative sam-
ple of private households living in Germany and currently covers about 20,000 individuals.11
In two waves of the SOEP, 1997 and 2002, individuals are asked questions on preferences
over public or private provision of childcare for pre-school aged children. The speci￿c
question in the questionnaire that we will use for the de￿nition of our dependent variable
is: ￿At present a multitude of social services are provided not only by the state but also
by private freemarket enterprises, organizations, associations, or private citizens. What is
your opinion on this? Who should be responsible for the care for pre-schoolers: ￿ only the
state ￿ mostly the state ￿ state and private forces ￿ mostly private forces ￿ only private
forces?￿ We argue that the answer to this question can be interpreted as preferences over
the three di￿erent childcare regimes de￿ned in the sections above.
Since the question on childcare preferences has only been asked twice in the SOEP, in
1997 and 2002, we can only use data from these two waves.12 Moreover, we restrict the
sample to individuals aged 20 to 65 years.
The most important explanatory variable in our model will be the pre-tax household
income.13 In order to allow for nonlinear e￿ects of income on household preferences, we
enter the income in a linear and squared term. If we were to impose linearity, we obviously
would not be able to ￿nd evidence for SRI. Hence, we use the quadratic form as a simple
form of possible non-linearity.
In addition to the pre-tax household income, we will include several other variables on
the right-hand side of our estimation equation, in particular, age, sex, number of children,
education variables, health status and region of residence. Summary statistics of these
variables can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix B.
The descriptive statistics of the distribution of the dependent variable presented in
Table 3 below show that the large majority of all interviewees have a preference for some
sort of mixed regime (answer categories 2, 3 or 4). Almost 50% of the sample state that
11More details on the SOEP can be found in Wagner et al. (2007).
12Note that we do not include the high-income sample in our analysis, since this sub-sample of the
GSOEP has been introduced only in 2002.
13As a sensitivity check, we have also estimated our model with the hourly wage instead of household
income as an explanatory variable, since private childcare costs are more closely related to wages than
household income. This speci￿cation leads to almost identical results as the models with household income.
Results are available from us.
21they ￿nd the state as well as private forces should be responsible for the care of pre-
schoolers. Roughly 30% favor a regime in which ￿mostly the state￿ is in charge, while
less than 10% favor ￿mostly private forces￿. Slightly more people, about 12%, prefer a
purely public regime. Those favoring a purely private system are a relatively small group,
roughly 3%. As Table 3 shows, we do not ￿nd large di￿erences in the distribution of
preferences over childcare regimes in the two years. Also the di￿erences by gender are
relatively small: Slightly more women prefer a mixed regime, while more men prefer a
purely or mostly public regime. Similarly, the presence of children under 18 years living
in the same household does not change preferences, and neither does family status (not
shown in the Table).
The largest di￿erence in the preferences over childcare in these descriptive tables can
be found between East and West Germany: Although the same fraction of people prefer a
purely public system and a mixed system, there is a large di￿erence between the preferences
for a ￿mostly public￿ system: this is the preferred regime for 34% of all individuals living
in East Germany, but only for 28% of those living in West Germany. On the other hand,
while 14% of West Germans prefer a ￿mostly private￿ or ￿purely private￿ system, this group
amounts to only 5% in East Germany. This indicates that East Germans may have di￿erent
attitudes towards government provision of childcare than West Germans. Of course, this
may be due to the fact that East Germans have di￿erent incomes and other socio-economic
characteristics, but below we will see that this e￿ect is found also in regressions including
income and other independent variables.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variable
Whole 1997 2002 Men Women West East
Sample Germany Germany
￿Who should be responsible for the care of pre-schoolers?￿ (Frequency in percent)
￿Only the state￿ 11.55 12.56 10.92 12.33 10.88 11.41 11.94
￿Mostly the state￿ 29.36 28.89 29.66 30.81 28.12 27.89 33.60
￿The State and private forces 47.79 47.71 47.85 45.43 49.82 47.17 49.62
￿Mostly private forces￿ 8.73 8.69 8.75 8.68 8.77 10.30 4.16
￿Only private forces￿ 2.59 2.22 2.81 2.76 2.42 3.23 0.68
Number of observations 19,996 7,836 12,018 9,219 10,777 14,781 5,125
Source: SOEP, waves 1997 and 2002.
225.2 The empirical model
In order to empirically analyze the e￿ect of income on childcare preferences over the three
di￿erent regimes, we estimate a discrete choice model with the preferences over childcare
regimes as dependent variable. Since discrete choice models can be interpreted as random
utility models14, we base our analysis on the idea that individual i perceives a utility level
Uij under each childcare regime j 2 fMO;GO;GMg. Individuals prefer the childcare
regime that provides them with the highest utility level. That is, the invididual will prefer
childcare regime k to any other regime if and only if Uik > Uij;8k 6= j. Since there are
aspects of Uik that are unobserved, it can be decomposed into an observed part Vik and
an unobserved part "ik that is treated as random. Typically, it is assumed that "ik is
distributed iid extreme value, and thus, following McFadden (1974) the probability Pik
that individual i chooses alternative k over all other alternatives,
Pik = Prob(Vik + "ik > Vij + "ij); 8k 6= j; (17)










where xi is a vector of explanatory variables and ¯j are parameter vectors to be estimated.
As explained above, the most important variable in xi is the pre-tax household income. In
addition, we control for family status (i.e. whether an individual has a partner) and other
socio-economic variables that can be interpreted as taste shifters, such as age, gender,
number of children in di￿erent age groups, education level, health status and state of
residence. In addition to the latter variable, we also include a dummy indicating that an
individual lives in East Germany. Controlling for state of residence picks up the di￿erent
levels of rationing across states in Germany.
14In the description of our model, we follow Train (2003).
15We choose to use a multinomial logit model instead of an ordered logit since the ordering in our case is
not straight-forward. Moreover, the multinomial logit model is more ￿exible, although we have to assume
that the error terms are distributed identically across alternatives.
23The nice feature of this model is that based on the estimated coe￿cients, we can predict
utility levels Vij for all individuals and all choice categories, i.e. childcare regimes. Using
the estimated coe￿cient vectors ^ ¯j, we will then plot the di￿erences in estimated utility
levels





We will use these predictions to compute the utility di￿erence (that is, the di￿erences
in the deterministic part of the utility levels) as a function of income in order to compare
our estimation results to the simulated results from Section 3.
5.3 Results
For our estimations, we draw on the pooled sample of the waves 1997 and 2002. The
basic model that we present in the following uses a de￿nition of the dependent variable as
follows: If individuals state that they prefer ￿only the state￿ or ￿mostly the state￿, we count
this as a preference for a purely public system. Similarly, we take individuals to prefer a
purely private system if they state that they wish ￿only private forces￿ or ￿mostly private
forces￿. Thus, only those explicitly stating that they wish a system with ￿both the state
and private forces￿ are assumed to prefer a mixed system.16
Estimation results in terms of coe￿cients and marginal e￿ects are presented in Tables
A.2 and A.3 in Appendix B. We ￿nd that household income decreases the probability that
individuals prefer the public childcare regime and increases the probability to prefer the
mixed system and the purely private system.
Con￿rming the descriptive ￿ndings, the multivariate analysis shows that women are,
other things equal, less likely to prefer a purely public system over the other two systems
than men. They do have a signi￿cantly higher probability to prefer the mixed system over
the other two. The total number of children under 18 living in the same household increases
the probability that the purely public system is preferred. The presence of children under
three years and between three and six years signi￿cantly increase the probability that a
mixed system is preferred and decrease the probability that a purely private system is
preferred. This ￿nding con￿rms our priors, since families with many children pay lower
16As a sensitivity analysis, we estimated the same models with a di￿erent de￿nition of the dependent
variable. In this case, we assume that those who choose either ￿mostly private forces￿ or ￿mostly the state￿
also prefer a mixed system. As Tables A.4 and A.5 in Appendix B show, estimation results are mostly the
same in both speci￿cations.
24fees per child in state run childcare centers and also bene￿t from various provisions in the
tax code.
One of the strongest predictors of preferences over childcare regimes is the region of
residence. Individuals living in East Germany have a much higher probability to prefer a
public system than West German residents, keeping income and all other socio-economic
control variables constant. Accordingly, East Germans have a signi￿cantly lower probabil-
ity (about 9 percentage points) to prefer a pure private system than West Germans.
Other control variables such as age and education also signi￿cantly a￿ect preferences
for childcare regimes: Age seems to decrease the probability to prefer the private system.
Individuals with intermediate schooling degree (￿Realschule￿) and high-school (￿Abitur￿)
or university degree are more likely to prefer the mixed regime and are less likely to prefer
the purely public regime than those with a lower school degree, who serve as reference
category.17
As a further sensitivity check, we have estimated all models for men and women sep-
arately, and mostly found the same results. Moreover, we have estimated the model sep-
arately for individuals living in East and West Germany. Surprisingly, we found that
our results are purely driven by West German residents. For individuals living in East
Germany, we found no statistically signi￿cant e￿ect of income on preferences over child-
care regimes. Thus, living in the East seems to have two e￿ects: First, East Germans
have a signi￿cantly lower preference for private childcare. This is similar to Alesina and
Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln’s (2007) ￿nding that East Germans generally have a lower preference for
government redistribution than West Germans. Their interpretation is that living un-
der communism in￿uences one’s preferences for government intervention. In the case of
childcare, we should note that under the socialist regime, childcare coverage was almost
universal and is still several times higher than in West Germany. Hence, it may be that liv-
ing with a universal state-run childcare regime signi￿cantly in￿uences people’s preferences
over regimes.18 Second, income does not seem to signi￿cantly a￿ect the preferences over
17As an alternative speci￿cation, we have also estimated a model in which we additionally control for
political party preferences. With this model, we found the same results as the ones presented here. Results
are available from us.
18It is not entirely clear, however, that we should interpret the results as saying that communism changes
people’s preferences, since the current childcare system still di￿ers between East and West. In particular,
there is larger availability of public childcare in the East and fees also di￿er between East and West.
Therefore, East and West Germans may have the same general preferences, but simply realise di￿erent
utility levels under the current regime.
25regimes in the East, while this is clearly the case in the West. One possible interpretation
is that income largely captures the individual redistributive gain that individuals perceive
under each system. Perhaps, in the East, socialisation leads individual preferences to be
determined less by income than by other factors, so that regardless of how rich they are,
all individuals have similar preferences for how childcare should be organised.19
In the next step, we predict the di￿erences in utility levels between the di￿erent child-
care regimes, from equation (20). Predictions are based on the sample mean of all individ-
uals and only vary by the level of pre-tax household income. We let the income start at
0 and run up to 110,000 Euro, which is between the 95th and the 99th percentile of the
income distribution. Based on these predictions, we calculate utility di￿erences between
pairs of childcare regimes in order to reproduce Figures 2￿7 on the basis of estimation
results.
Figure 8 shows the di￿erence in utility levels under the purely public and the purely
private childcare regime. The shape of the curve is very similar to those shown in Figure 2
and Figure 5: the higher income, the less likely is purely public childcare provision preferred
over the purely private system.
The di￿erence in utility levels between the purely private over the mixed provision of
childcare, shown in Figure 9, also looks very much like the Figures from the simulated
model, Figures 3 and 6. The higher income, the more likely is the private system preferred
over the mixed system.
So far, we ￿nd support for the theoretical model. The most important di￿erence be-
tween the Figures based on our empirical estimations and those based on the simulated
model is a ￿level￿ e￿ect that seems not to be captured in the theoretical model. Based on
our estimation results, we ￿nd that the purely private system is generally less preferred
than predicted on the basis of the theoretical model. For example, as can be seen from
Figure 8, the di￿erence between the utility level under the public and private system never
gets negative, not even for high levels of household income. Similarly, Figure 9 shows that
the di￿erence between utility under the purely private regime and the mixed system never
gets positive. (Note that these ￿gures represent the marginal e￿ect of household income,
while all other variables are kept constant at the sample mean. That is, for some values
of the independent variables away from the mean the utility di￿erence between MO and
19Note that Alesina and Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln (2007) capture only the ￿rst e￿ect, but do not analyse whether

















































































Figure 9: Empirical preferences for pure private vs mixed provision
27GO or between MO and GM will clearly become positive.) One way to view this is that
parents are averse to pure market provision. It might simply be that, for whatever reason,
parents view markets as inferior to government provision of childcare. For instance, a pure
market allocation will lead to greater inequality of opportunities, or it may be thought to
be desirable to facilitate labour force participation by women through greater availabil-
ity of childcare than provided by the market (see, e.g., Blau and Currie, 2006). Further,
there are well known market failures in childcare provision. First, liquidity constraints
due to capital market imperfections may prevent low income parents from making optimal
childcare choices for their children. Second, asymmetric information about the quality of
childcare may lead to moral hazard of providers or adverse selection. Indeed, an often
heard concern about private childcare is that quality is low (see Blau, 2001). Parents may
thus perceive a quality di￿erence between public and private childcare. And third, there
may be positive externalities from high quality care in the form of better social outcomes
such as reduced crime or unemployment, lower drug use, and so forth.20 Suppose there is
a market failure which leads to a welfare loss, say, µ, which is unrelated to income. We
could easily amend our model and redraw the plots of V GO¡V MO and V MO¡V GM. Since
they would shift by µ, they would look similar to Figures 8 and 9.
Finally, Figure 10 shows that the utility di￿erential between public and mixed (GO
vs GM) provision is decreasing in household income. This is an especially noteworthy
￿nding, since theory predicts that in the case of SRI, this function should be increasing
in income over the lower and middle income range. However, we clearly ￿nd no support
for this. Hence, taken at face value, our results are not consistent with the the validity
of SRI. Rather, they are consistent with SDI, i.e. the hypothesis that richer parents want
less public childcare than poorer ones. We conclude that public provision of childcare in
Germany should result in a ‘standard’ type of rich versus poor equilibrium rather than an
‘ends against the middle’ equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we apply a model of publicly provided private goods to the provision of
childcare. We compare preferences over private, public and mixed provision, and how
these preferences vary with income. We then estimate empirically the e￿ect of income
































Figure 10: Empirical preferences for pure public vs mixed provision
on reported preferences of respondents to the SOEP. Our ￿ndings are consistent with
the theoretical model. In particular, richer individuals prefer private provision to either
public or mixed provision. Concerning the preference for mixed versus public provision,
we ￿nd that richer individuals prefer mixed provision. Based on the theoretical model,
this evidence is consistent with the view that public provision redistributes from rich to
poor rather than poor to rich. Thus, we ￿nd no support for the ends-against-the-middle
hypothesis, under which public provision should be favored by the middle class and mixed
provision by the rich and poor. As far as we know, this is the ￿rst piece of direct evidence
on this question.
We also ￿nd that preferences di￿er signi￿cantly between East and West Germans,
consistent with the historic and persisting di￿erences in childcare provision between the
two parts of the country.
Our approach could be extended in several directions. One possibility would be to
elaborate on the micro-foundations of childcare provision by allowing households to choose
between institutional care and home care and to explicitly introduce the e￿ects of childcare
on labour supply. This, we believe, would be an interesting extension, which, however,
should not produce major qualitative changes. Another possibility would be to look at a
cooperative or non-cooperative game where spouses bargain over the provision of childcare
29and the division of labour more generally. This is surely an interesting avenue, which
would, however, greatly complicate the analysis and is therefore left for future research.
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Proof or Proposition 1. From the GBC, we can rewrite V GO as u((1¡t)w;G) = u(w¡
w= ¹ wG;G). Since GGO maximises u((1 ¡ t)wm;G) = u(wm ¡ wm= ¹ wG;G), the household
with median income must prefer public provision since wm < ¹ w implies they are e￿ectively
subsidised by public provision. Consider now the household with mean income. Since
p( ¹ w) = 1 but GGO maximises u(wm ¡ wm= ¹ wG;G), the average income household prefers
market provision, and so do all households with w > ¹ w. Since V GO ¡ V MO is continuous
in w, by the intermediate value theorem, there must be some ^ w with wm < ^ w < ¹ w who is
just indi￿erent between government and market provision. ¥
Proof or Proposition 2. The decisive voter under GM could always vote for t =
G = 0, and hence, if they don’t they prefer GM to MO. All households with w > ~ w()
prefer MO by revealed preference: V GM;P > V GM;S, and tGM > 0 implies V MO = v(w) >
v((1 ¡ tGM)w) = V GM. Since V GM and V MO are continuous, by the intermediate value
theorem, there is a household that is exactly indi￿erent between the two systems. An
argument analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 establishes that this income level is
unique. ¥
Proof or Proposition 3. (i) See Figure A.1. Let point A characterise the equilibrium
under GM and B the equilibrium under GO. Suppose the household with indi￿erence curve
V 0 (and income w0) is just indi￿erent between the regimes (the way the Figure is drawn,
this household chooses public provision under the GM regime, but this is not important).
All households with higher income have indi￿erence curves which are ￿atter and have a
corner to the right of the corner of V 0, such as the household with indi￿erence curve V 00
and income w00 > w0. Hence, they prefer A to B. Likewise, we can easily show that all
w < w0 prefer B to A.
(ii) See Figure A.2. Let point A characterise the equilibrium under GM and B the
equilibrium under GO. The indi￿erence curves labeled V 00 and V 000 correspond to those
of two households with income w00 and w000, where SRI implies w000 > w00. Note that
both households are indi￿erent between the regimes. All households with w < w00 have







Figure A.1: Preferences over GM and GO regime (SDI)
curve is to the left of A, they must prefer A to B. Households with income w00 < w < w000
have steeper indi￿erence curves than V 00 at point A and a corner of the indi￿erence curves
to the left of A. Finally, all households with income w > w000 have a corner to the right
of and indi￿erence curves steeper than V 000. We can show that those with w00 < w < w000
prefer B to A while those with w > w000 prefer A to B. ¥







Figure A.2: Preferences over GM and GO regime (SRI)
34Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory Variables
Variable Mean Std. Deviation
pre-tax household income / 1,000 39.81 28.75
female 0.54 ￿
age 43.97 11.26
children under 3 yes/no 0.09 ￿
children 3-6 yes/no 0.11 ￿
number of children under 18 0.998 1.09
education level: intermediate (￿Realschule￿) 0.33 ￿
education level: upper secondary (￿Abitur￿) 0.08 ￿
education level: university 0.15 ￿
education level: other (e.g. foreign) 0.09 ￿
resident of east Germany 0.26 ￿
German citizenship 0.89 ￿
degree of disability (in %) 5.20 17.32
year 2002 0.61 ￿
Berlin 0.04 ￿
Schleswig-Holstein 0.03 ￿
Hamburg or Bremen 0.02 ￿
Niedersachsen 0.08 ￿
Hessen 0.07 ￿








Total number of observations 19,996
Source: SOEP, waves 1997 and 2002.
Note: Reference category for education level is ￿less than intermediate￿.
Reference category for federal states is Nordrhein-Westfalen.
35Table A.2: Estimation Results: Coe￿cients
￿Only￿ or ￿Mostly￿ the state ￿Only￿ or ￿Mostly￿ private forces
Variable Coe￿cient Std. Err. Coe￿cient Std. Err.
pre-tax household income -0.0030 0.0009 *** 0.0035 0.0018 **
pre-tax household income squared 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 **
single -0.0666 0.0721 * 0.0422 0.0582
female -0.1984 0.0308 *** -0.1048 0.0482 **
age 0.0011 0.0128 -0.0545 0.0202 **
age squared 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0002 ***
children under 3 yes/no -0.1443 0.0577 ** -0.2573 0.0939 ***
children 3-6 yes/no -0.0876 0.0540 -0.2414 0.0873 ***
number of children under 18 0.0754 0.0173 *** 0.0475 0.0278 *
education level: intermediate -0.1583 0.0385 *** -0.0414 0.0611
education level: upper secondary -0.2242 0.0602 *** -0.0201 0.0931
education level: other -0.1135 0.0629 * 0.0345 0.0897
education level: university -0.2030 0.0477 *** -0.0133 0.0721
resident of east Germany 0.1516 0.1521 -1.1138 0.3600 ***
German citizenship -0.1189 0.0560 ** -0.2783 0.0790 ***
disabled 0.0003 0.0009 -0.0018 0.0015
year 2002 0.0304 0.0315 0.0353 0.0499
Berlin 0.2367 0.1081 ** -0.1606 0.1770
Schleswig-Holstein -0.0873 0.1093 0.8954 0.1199 ***
Hamburg or Bremen 0.3125 0.1136 *** -0.0902 0.1849
Niedersachsen 0.4117 0.0616 *** -0.1757 0.1039 *
Hessen 0.2110 0.0672 *** 0.0063 0.1021
Rheinland-Pfalz or Saarland 0.2027 0.0705 *** 0.1380 0.1053
Baden-W￿rttemberg 0.1500 0.0559 *** 0.3095 0.0779 ***
Bayern -0.0562 0.0549 0.3431 0.0741 ***
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.0774 0.1802 0.1192 0.4302
Brandenburg 0.1188 0.1705 -0.0272 0.4130
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.1345 0.1698 -0.1038 0.4138
Thueringen 0.1975 0.1706 0.3968 0.4018
Sachsen -0.0946 0.1648 0.4971 0.3856
constant 0.0647 0.2669 -0.3044 0.4186
Log-Likelihood: -18883.797
Number of observations: 19,996
F-Test on joint signi￿cance of income and income squared: Prob > chi2 = 0.0002
Note: Choice Category ￿State and Private Forces￿ serves as base category.
(*/**/***): indicates signi￿cance at the 1%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source:Estimations based on SOEP, waves 1997 and 2002.
36Table A.3: Estimation Results: Marginal E￿ects
￿Only￿ or ￿Mostly￿ The State and ￿Only￿ or ￿Mostly￿
the State Private Forces Private Forces
Variable Marg. E￿. Std. Err. Marg. E￿. Std. Err. Marg. E￿. Std. Err.
pre-tax hh. income -0.0008 0.0002 *** 0.0004 0.0002 * 0.0005 0.0002 ***
pre-tax hh. income squared 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 **
single -0.0178 0.0072 ** 0.0112 0.0088 0.0067 0.0052
female -0.0437 0.0081 *** 0.0449 0.0072 *** -0.0012 0.0042
age 0.0025 0.0029 0.0024 0.0030 -0.0050 0.0018 ***
age squared -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 ***
children under 3 yes/no -0.0249 0.0133 * 0.0414 0.0135 *** -0.0165 0.0073 **
children 3-6 yes/no -0.0119 0.0125 0.0291 0.0127 ** -0.0173 0.0067 ***
number of children under 18 0.0163 0.0040 *** -0.0175 0.0041 *** 0.0011 0.0024
education level: interm. -0.0364 0.0089 *** 0.0337 0.0090 *** 0.0028 0.0051
education level: upper sec. -0.0525 0.0135 *** 0.0452 0.0140 *** 0.0073 0.0086
education level: other -0.0287 0.0142 ** 0.0207 0.0146 0.0080 0.0082
education level: university -0.0479 0.0108 *** 0.0408 0.0111 *** 0.0071 0.0066
resident of east Germany 0.0773 0.0368 ** 0.0108 0.0374 -0.0881 0.0218 ***
German citizenship -0.0162 0.0129 0.0378 0.0128 *** -0.0217 0.0078 ***
disabled 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001
year 2002 0.0059 0.0073 -0.0078 0.0074 0.0019 0.0043
(federal state dummies skipped)
(coe￿cients see Table A2)
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 1997 and 2002.
(*/**/***): indicates signi￿cance at the 1%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
37Table A.4: Estimation Results: Coe￿cients
￿Only the state￿ ￿Only private forces￿
Variable Coe￿cient Std. Err. Coe￿cient Std. Err.
pre-tax household income -0.0045 0.0154 *** 0.0088 0.0040 **
pre-tax household income squared 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 *
single -0.0231 0.0557 0.0933 0.1144
female -0.1570 0.0453 *** -0.1175 0.0924
age 0.0053 0.0192 -0.0414 0.0382
age squared -0.0001 0.0002 0.0006 0.0004
children under 3 yes/no -0.1928 0.0873 ** -0.1202 0.1785
children 3-6 yes/no -0.1601 0.0807 ** -0.5677 0.1840 ***
number of children under 18 0.1263 0.0242 *** 0.1073 0.0531 **
education level: lower secondary -0.2964 0.0583 *** -0.2001 0.1235
education level: upper secondary -0.5322 0.0991 *** -0.1448 0.1782
education level: other -0.0164 0.0862 0.1667 0.1618
education level: university -0.4366 0.0776 *** -0.1168 0.1373
resident of east Germany 0.3277 0.2082 -1.1119 0.5613 **
German citizenship -0.1565 0.0779 ** -0.2760 0.1438 *
disabled 0.0017 0.0013 -0.0010 0.0027
year 2002 -0.0647 0.0458 0.1852 0.0980 *
Berlin 0.2774 0.1534 * 0.3048 0.2575
Schleswig-Holstein -0.0935 0.1625 1.4284 0.1619 ***
Hamburg or Bremen 0.1343 0.1675 -0.6040 0.3919
Niedersachsen 0.5424 0.0820 *** -0.3020 0.1865 *
Hessen 0.2043 0.0950 ** -0.2719 0.1924
Rheinland-Pfalz or Saarland -0.0596 0.1049 -0.6072 0.2334 ***
Baden-W￿rttemberg -0.2558 0.0863 *** -0.2229 0.1468 *
Bayern -0.2141 0.0838 ** -0.1474 0.1433
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern -0.4406 0.2600 * -1.6645 1.1489
Brandenburg -0.2159 0.2369 -0.5678 0.7216
Sachsen-Anhalt 0.1076 0.2308 -1.5046 0.9059
Thueringen -0.4106 0.2398 * -0.2607 0.6770
Sachsen -0.3778 0.2288 * 0.0399 0.6188
constant -1.6082 0.4031 *** -2.699 0.7939 ***
Log-Likelihood: -9183.9684
Number of observations: 19,996
F-Test on joint signi￿cance of income and income squared: Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
Note: Choice Category ￿Mostly the state, the state and private forces or mostly private
forces￿ serves as base category.
(*/**/***): indicates signi￿cance at the 1%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
Source:Estimations based on SOEP, waves 1997 and 2002.
38Table A.5: Estimation Results: Marginal E￿ects
Mostly the state /
Only The state and Only
the state private forces/ private forces
Mostly Private Forces
Variable Marg. E￿. Std. Err. Marg. E￿. Std. Err. Marg. E￿. Std. Err.
pre-tax hh. income -0.0046 0.0002 *** 0.0003 0.0002 * 0.0002 0.0001 **
pre-tax hh. income squared 0.0000 0.0000 * 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
single -0.0025 0.0054 0.0006 0.0058 0.0018 0.0022
female -0.0153 0.0045 *** 0.0171 0.0047 *** -0.0019 0.0017
age 0.0006 0.0019 0.0002 0.0022 -0.0008 0.0007
age squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
children under 3 yes/no -0.0176 0.0076 ** 0.0194 0.0080 ** -0.0018 0.0031
children 3-6 yes/no -0.0141 0.0072 * 0.0225 0.0075 *** -0.0084 0.0023 ***
number of children under 18 0.0122 0.0023 *** -0.0139 0.0025 *** 0.0017 0.0009 *
education level: interm. -0.0277 0.0053 *** 0.0307 0.0056 *** -0.0031 0.0022
education level: upper sec. -0.0438 0.0068 *** 0.0456 0.0074 *** -0.0017 0.0031
education level: other -0.0020 0.0084 -0.0014 0.0089 0.0033 0.0034
education level: university -0.0380 0.0060 *** 0.0393 0.0064 *** -0.0013 0.0024
resident of east Germany 0.0364 0.0233 -0.0193 0.0241 -0.0171 0.0068 **
German citizenship -0.0154 0.0084 * 0.0207 0.0088 ** -0.0053 0.0032
disabled 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
year 2002 -0.0068 0.0045 0.0032 0.0048 0.0035 0.0018 *
(federal state dummies skipped)
(coe￿cients see Table A4)
Source: Estimations based on SOEP, waves 1997 and 2002.
(*/**/***): indicates signi￿cance at the 1%- / 5%- / 1%-level.
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